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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY - CORPORATE REoRANIzATION - A FAI AND EQUITABLE
PLAN-[United States].-A holding company, insolvent both in the equity
and in the bankruptcy sense, filed a petition for reorganization under 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act. Two bondholders, holding a small percentage of
the face value of the debtor's bonds, opposed the plan contending that it
was not fair and equitable. Their objection was that stockholders of the
old company were to be included in the new, despite the absence of a stock-
holders' equity in the old company., The district court approved the plan;
it was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 2 On a writ of certiorari
the judgment was reversed, the Supreme Court holding that the plan was
not fair and equitable within the requirements of 77B.3
Prior to the enactment of 77B, the courts were in the main applying
two theories of priority rights in corporate reorganization proceedings. One
was the so-called theory of relative priority and the other that of absolute
priority.4 In the former, the bondholders receive new securities in ex-
change for their old with an approximate5 equal income and principal claim
prior to that of the old stockholders.0 In the latter, the bondholders are
accorded full priority as to both principal and defaulted interest; and the
old stockholders cannot be included unless they furnish a quid pro quo for
such interest as they acquire in the new corporation.7 A third view ad-
vanced by reorganization managers involves a scaling down of the assets
of the debtor.8 This group feels that practical considerations make it "not
1. The financial arrangement may briefly be stated as follows: The assets
were $900,000, while the claims of the bondholders for principal and inter-
est were approximately $3,800,000. If all of the assets were turned over
to the bondholders they would realize less than twenty-five per cent on their
claims. Yet under the plan they were required to surrender to the stock-
holders twenty-three per cent of the value of the enterprise in the form
of stock in the new company. The objecting bondholders owned only $18,500
face amount of a large bond issue.
2. In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1938) 24 F.
Supp. 501, aff'd, In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1939)
100 F. (2d) 963.
3. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 1.
4. The material in this paragraph is more fully discussed in an article
by Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights (1928)
28 Col. L. Rev. 127 and cases discussed and cited in the article. See also
Finletter, Principles of Corporate Reorganization (1937) c. 6, 375; Note
(1938) 23 WASHINGTON UNIvERITY LAW QUARTERLY 543.
5. "Approximately" is used because the specific amount usually depends
on the bargain reached between each group by the reorganization managers.
6. Downtown Investment Co. v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc. (C. C.
A. 1, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314.
7. Tellier v. Franks Laundry Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 561;
In re Barclay Park Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 595; Sophian v.
Congress Realty Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 499.
8. Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights
(1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 127, 131; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on
Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 541-570,
1940]
Washington University Open Scholarship
280 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
feasible in most reorganizations to give to the mortgage bondholders securi-
ties worth the par value of their bonds, since this would almost never leave
any securities available as a lure to induce stockholders to pay their assess-
ments." 9 Equitable reorganizations have involved a combination of two and
sometimes all three of these theories.10 77B provided that a plan should
become effective upon approval by a two-thirds majority of each class of
creditors or shareholders, if the judge found that it was fair and equitable,
did not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class, and was feasible. 1
However, the statute did not specify which of these theories the judge
should follow in determining whether the plan was a fair one.
2
In Downto'wn Investment Co. v. Boston Metropolitan Buildings, Inc.,13 the
court, in construing section 77B, seemingly approved the relative priority
theory which would permit old stockholders of an insolvent company to
retain an interest in the new corporation without requiring any pecuniary
contribution on their part. Other lower federal courts, however, followed
the absolute priority theory holding that, in order to justify a retention
of a stock interest by stockholders, it must appear that they have furnished
an additional consideration or have an equity in the estate of the debtor
after the rights of the creditor are fully provided for in some way.1 4
698-718, 716. Frank criticizes the arguments of Mr. Swain, one of the
leaders of the corporate reorganization managers. See also Finletter, Prin-
ciples of Corporate Reorganization (1937) c. 6, 390.
9. Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights
(1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 127, 131.
10. Supra note 9, at 144. This usually comes up in situations where
there are different classes of securities that lead to the acceptance of this
or that arrangement between the bondholders' and the stockholders' com-
mittees.
11. Bankruptcy Act (1934) 48 Stat. 911, c. 424, sec. f, (1939 Supp.)
11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207. 77B, as amended, is now Chapter X of the new
Bankruptcy Act.
12. Levi, Corporate Reorganization and a Ministry of Justice (1938) 23
Minm. L. Rev. 3. In the instant case the court also points out the necessity
on the part of the bankruptcy judge to investigate the plan thoroughly.
It is well settled that the number agreeing does not in itself render the
plan a fair one. Sophian v. Congress Realty Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1938) 98
F. (2d) 499; Tellier v. Franks Laundry Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 101 F.
(2d) 561.
13. (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314. This plan was held invalid on
other grounds, but it is submitted in light of the principal case that the
Supreme Court would not affirm this view. The language of the court seems
to indicate an adoption of the relative priority theory and in part the views
advanced by the reorganization managers. The court said:--"We therefore
hold that section 77B does not require that every plan approved as fair
and equitable shall be of such a character that it would withstand attack
by nonassenting creditors asserting their strict legal rights unaffected by
any principles of the Bankruptcy Act. * * * To hold that the phrase 'fair
and equitable' has the same meaning when applied to a reorganization
under 77B as it had in equity receiverships, is to eliminate from it to a
certain degree the rights of creditors and shareholders to adjust their
respective rights by contract and nullify provisions of the Act which was
passed to facilitate corporate reorganization." 81 F. (2d) at 323.
14. In re Barclay Park Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 595.
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The Supreme Court in the instant case adopts this latter view and thus
clarifies the ambiguity resulting from the statute. Once again the cor-
porate reorganization lawyers seem to have suffered a setback.' 5 After
the passage of the Bankruptcy Act, this group felt that the reorganization
of an insolvent corporation would be more practical with less attention
paid to dissenting minorities ;16 and that consequently the stockholders of a
bankrupt concern having no equities could be included in the reorganized
company without furnishing additional consideration. The holding in the
principal case, however, definitely repudiates such a view.
L. M. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE POWER-WAGE REGULATION-FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS AcT-[Federal].-Plaintiff, pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act,' procured a subpoena duces tecum ordering defendant to
produce wage-books covering employees in its mail order branch at Kansas
City. Defendant resisted on the ground, inter alia, that the Act, in so far
as it seeks to apply to production for commerce as such, exceeds the inter-
state commerce power. Held, that the Act is within the commerce power.2
The Act seeks to eliminate from industry labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for the
health, efficiency, and general well-being of the works for several reasons,
each presumed to justify invocation of federal power.3 Of these, the court
seems to emphasize the first, namely, that these conditions cause commerce
and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread
and perpetuate such undesirable labor conditions among the workers of the
several states. 4 This seems to appeal to the recognized federal power to
exclude from interstate commerce such things as would have a deleterious
effect. Thus Congress may remove the immunity from state control of
liquor as an article of commerce, since it is deleterious to morals and health.5
Congress may prohibit traffic in diseased cattle, for no one is entitled by
15. The first setback was in Northern Fac. Ry. v. Boyd (1912) 228
U. S. 482. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Cor-
porate Reorganization (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 541, 550.
16. Dodd, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy For What?
(1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1100, 1110; Foster, Conflicting Ideals For Reor-
ganization (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 923, 959.
1. Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, (1938 Supp.) 29
U. S. C. A. secs. 201-219. The Act regulates the employment of those en-
gaged in interstate commerce or production for such commerce. Employees
"employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local
retailing capacity, * * * or any employee * * * the greater part of whose
selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce * * *," are exempted from
the provisions of the Act. (1938 Supp.) 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 213. The instant
case is not brought within this exception.
2. Andrews v. Montgomery, Ward & Co. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1939) 84
C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. par. 18,465.
3. Note (1939) 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68.
4. (1938 Supp.) 29 U. S. C. A. see. 202a (1).
5. In re Rahrer (1891) 140 U. S. 545.
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